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Abstract
The European Commission expected to assess the implementation of the 2013 Rec-
ommendation on collective redress by 26 July 2017, yet the Commission missed the 
deadline. Despite this failure, the Recommendation is still on the eu agenda: a public 
consultation has been started with the intention to assess how the eu member states 
responded to the 2013 proposal. On the one hand, it should be welcomed that the Com-
mission remains ambitious regarding an eu-wide collective redress mechanism. On 
the other hand, it should be highlighted that the Commission is concentrating too 
much on the American system, which significantly differs in terms of rationale, de-
sign, and stated goals. Indeed, utilising one or another American element does not 
inevitably lead to the perceived issue of “blackmail settlement”. This is further quali-
fied by positive experiences in pro-active eu member states, which have experimented 
with us-oriented tools in order to facilitate collective actions in their jurisdictions. 
This article explores how insights from the eu countries and the us should influence 
the debate on eu-style collective antitrust redress, if and when the time arises to take 
another step in the field.
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More than 4 years have passed since the European Commission adopted the 
reform on damages actions in June 2013. The reform sought to facilitate anti-
trust damages actions across the European Union. The most important mile-
stone was reached in November 2014, when the eu adopted the Directive 
on antitrust damages actions.1 Its main objective was to ensure that victims 
could effectively exercise their right to claim full compensation. However, the 
achievement of full compensation is highly distorted for victims who suffered 
low value harm (such as consumers and purchasers). The Directive does not 
include provisions on collective redress; instead, the horizontal Recommen-
dation on collective redress was adopted for this purpose.2 It is not a legally 
binding document, and as such cannot force member states to take action; 
it only urges it. However, the Recommendation still represents the latest and 
the most concrete eu proposal, under which the preparation of legislation has 
been made for a coherent European framework for collective redress. This doc-
ument has two main goals. The first is to facilitate access to justice, and to en-
able compensation in mass harm situations. The second is to prevent the same 
kind of litigation abuses that have occurred in us class actions. It was planned 
that by 26 July 2017, the European Commission would assess the practical 
implementation of the Recommendation and, if necessary, propose further 
legislative measures. However, the Commission missed this deadline. Despite 
this, the Commission still seeks to fulfil its obligations from 2013. Therefore, a 
public consultation has been started in order to assess the implementation of 
the Recommendation in the member states. The results should be made public 
at some time in 2017. If the Commission finds that there is a need to regulate 
collective actions at the eu level, consumers may expect a new policy instru-
ment in the following years.
Regardless of what the results of the consultation will be, the truth is that 
the Recommendation has had little real impact on the development of col-
lective actions in the eu and that these actions are getting more and more 
divergent across the member states. An even more important factor that an-
titrust mass claims have been brought in states which disregard the proposed 
1 Directive 2014/104/eu of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 
on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014] oj l349.
2 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for collective redress 
mechanisms in the Member States for injunctions against and claims on damages caused by 
violations of eu rights com(2013) 3539/3.
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principles of the Commission, and instead allow for us-oriented tools in some 
fashion. In light of these observations, this paper will provide an overview of 
the proposed eu approach and suggest possible amendments to the expected 
legislative measures in the near future.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section provides an over-
view of the development of collective redress, ranging from the 2005 Green 
Paper to the 2013 Recommendation. The study of the Commission’s proposed 
approach is outlined in section three. The last section gives an overview of the 
schemes of member states that disregard some conservative principles of the 
eu approach in order to achieve success in collective litigation.
2 An Overview of the Commission’s Recommendation  
on Collective Redress
The Commission’s efforts to introduce an eu-wide private antitrust enforce-
ment may be traced back to the 2005 Green Paper on damages actions.3 The 
main objective was to identify barriers to the further promotion of antitrust 
damage actions.4 Furthermore, collective redress actions were proposed as a 
tool for protecting consumers and purchasers with small claims. Despite the 
Commission proposing a number of options to facilitate damages claims, the 
efforts were highly criticised.5 Building on these initial efforts, the Commis-
sion published the 2008 White Paper on damages actions.6 In order to stim-
ulate damage claims, the document included a broad range of suggestions: 
(1) the availability of full compensation (actual loss plus and the loss of prof-
it); (2) the judge-controlled disclosure; (3) binding effect on nca’s decisions; 
3 European Commission, “Green Paper—Damages actions for breach of the ec antitrust rules”, 
com (2005) 672 final.
4 At this point, the Commission identified 6 main obstacles to creating a more effective sys-
tem of antitrust damages actions. They relate to the following areas: (i) access to evidence 
(ii) damages (iii) defending consumer interests (iv) effect of damages claims on the leni-
ency programme (v) defending consumer interests (possibility of collective actions) (vi) The 
passing-on defence and indirect purchaser’s standing.
5 See, e.g. Editorial comments, “A little more action please!—The White Paper on Damages Ac-
tions for Breach of the ec Antitrust Rules” Common Market Law Review 45(3) (2008) 609–615; 
Office of Fair Trading, “Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper, Damages Ac-
tions for Breach of the ec Antitrust Rules” (2006), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_comments/office_of_fair_trading.pdf>.
6 European Commission, “White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the ec antitrust 
rules”, com (2008) 165.
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(4) single damages rather than multiple damages. In addition, the White Pa-
per recognised a clear need for collective redress mechanisms, as the exist-
ing means for the aggregation of individual claims were often limited and the 
harm caused by competition infringement was typically scattered amongst a 
large number of injured parties.7 As a result, two types of collective actions 
were suggested: (i) representative actions; and (ii) opt-in collective actions.
In both papers, the European Commission failed to find a consensus for 
an eu-wide legislation on antitrust collective redress. This is mainly because 
member states were against a sector-specific measure in the field. However, 
these failures incentivised the Commission to carry out a public consultation 
in February 2011.8 This time the proposal supported a horizontal approach, 
which allows for all types of collective redress actions. In particular, it set out 
the core principles for a coherent European horizontal framework for collec-
tive redress in the subsequent Recommendation on collective redress.9 The 
main principles that the Commission expects the member states to abide by 
are the following:10
• Depending on the type of claim, collective redress can take two forms: in-
junctive relief (claims seeking to stop unlawful practice) and compensatory 
actions (claims seeking compensation for damage suffered).
• An opt-in principle should be the only approach to aggregate victims in col-
lective redress claims. Under this model, the group includes victims who 
express consent to join the action.
• A clear distinction is made between public enforcement and compensatory 
damages actions: both instruments remain institutionally independent of 
each other. Public enforcement focuses on the punitive objective-function. 
This function is pursued through the imposition of fines. Compensatory 
collective redress actions should serve the objective of full compensation, 
i.e. the compensation model that sets the background for the Directive on 
7 Ibid., sec 2.1.
8 European Commission, “Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress”, sec (2011) 173 final.
9 Together with the Recommendation, it was issued the Communication from the Com-
mission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a European Horizontal Frame-
work for Collective Redress”, com(2013) 401/2.
10 The following discussion is based on the Recommendation, op.cit note 2; Communication 
op.cit note 9.
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damages actions.11 Therefore, punitive damages, multiple or other damages, 
which lead to overcompensation, should be prohibited in a European col-
lective redress mechanism.
• The Recommendation allows for both group actions and representative ac-
tions. The provisions on group actions are not widely discussed in the Rec-
ommendation. It can be argued that the Commission’s main objective is to 
facilitate representative actions. This representation model better achieves 
the interests of victims, because public authorities are bound by their or-
ganisational mission to represent them in their best interests. Accordingly, 
legal standing can only be granted to entities designated in advance or by 
entities which have been certified on an ad hoc basis.
• Member States should not permit contingency fees, as this risks creating an 
incentive to conduct abusive litigation. The Commission establishes strict 
safeguards on third party funding. The funders are to be scrutinised in order 
to guarantee that there are no conflicts of interest, and that they have suf-
ficient funds to support the legal action. Finally, the ‘loser pays’ principle 
should be predominant for reimbursing legal costs to winners.
The principles outlined in the Recommendation are non-binding, and hence, 
states are only encouraged to follow them. In June 2013, it was decided that 
the implementation of the Recommendation will be assessed by 26 July 2017, 
and further legislative measures will be proposed, if found necessary. How-
ever, the Commission has failed in assessing the practical implementation 
of the Recommendation in time. Despite this failure, the Recommendation 
is still on the eu agenda: the Commission has started a consultation on the 
functioning of collective redress schemes in the eu member states. The Com-
mission should provide a report during 2017. For the potential stakeholders, 
the most important thing is that the European Commission has not changed 
its policy since 2013. Therefore, the measures proposed in the 2013 Recom-
mendation are still considered the most appropriate for the eu policy on col-
lective redress.
11 According to article 1 of the Directive, op.cit note 1, anyone who has suffered harm by 
antitrust infringement can effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation. The 
Directive reaffirms the eu acquis communautaire: White Paper, op.cit note 6 and the 
judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case c-453/99 Courage Ltd. 
v. Bernard Crehan [2001] ecr i-6297 and Joined Cases c-295/04 to 298/04 Vincenzo Man-
fredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] ecr i-6619.
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3 A Study of the Commission’s Approach
Although the Recommendation is not legally binding, it is the most concrete 
eu policy measure in the area of collective redress. The Recommendation rep-
resents the eu position, according to which an indirect action has been made 
for the preparation of legislation for a coherent European framework for col-
lective redress. Logically, it should share the best practices that would incentiv-
ise member states to reconsider the available collective redress schemes, or to 
incentivise their development in states that have not yet adopted them. How-
ever, the implementation of the Recommendation has failed, because member 
states have introduced collective redress schemes in their own fashion. Even if 
it may sound paradoxical, this failure should be welcomed. This is notable be-
cause the Commission’s proposed measures/safeguards are too robust for col-
lective actions (especially in antitrust) to ever be brought to the courts. In fact, 
the strong safeguard mechanism is rather a reflection of the eu’s conservative 
approach, which seeks to avoid any relationship with the American system. 
However, the experiences in the eu member states have shown that antitrust 
collective actions have been brought in countries that disregard conservative 
eu measures and instead experiment with us-oriented tools. All these points 
will be discussed below.
3.1 The Surrounding Controversies
The stated goal of the Recommendation is to provide better means of access 
to justice, and to enable compensation in mass harm situations. In order to 
achieve this goal, the Recommendation combines tools that are based on the 
conservative approach. First, there is a predominance of the ‘loser-pays’ prin-
ciple and an opt-in measure. Second, the eu model prohibits contingency fees 
and punitive damages—also, third party funding is subject to strict limitations. 
Third, the representative entities need to meet strict requirements for bring-
ing representative actions: a non-profit making character, a direct relationship 
between the activities of entity and the violation, and sufficient capacity in 
terms of financial and human resources.12 Together, these tools act as robust 
safeguards against abusive litigation. However, these safeguards simultane-
ously reduce the incentives of bringing compensatory collective actions to a 
minimum.13 In essence, a defeat in a case would entail having to compensate 
the other side’s costs, which may be significant. Moreover, opt-in schemes are 
12 Recommendation, op.cit note 2, para. 4.
13 Some commentators argue that the eu policy on collective redress faces the ‘Catch 
22’ problem, under which safeguards are in fact working as barriers. See C. Hodges, 
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accused of attracting a too low participation rate, which absolutely diminishes 
the financial viability of collective actions.14 Finally, the prohibition of con-
tingency fees lessens the possibilities of reaping awards outweighing the risks 
of litigation. Under these conditions, few rational actors would be willing or 
capable of bringing costly antitrust collective actions. As such, the objective of 
compensating victims in mass harm situations is likely to fail to a large extent, 
as collective actions are unlikely to be brought. As such, a large majority of 
victims will remain uncompensated.
Another concern is that the Recommendation fails to lay down clear re-
quirements on how the eu policy should be formed. The proposed principles 
are poorly defined, and create legal uncertainty by including many exemp-
tions.15 Table 1 below explains these exemptions:
The issue is that the Commission urges member states to implement the 
proposed principles, yet there is a lot of space for interpretations. But the Eu-
ropean Commission has already observed that a lack of clarity in the soft law 
may lead to further fragmentation in the national systems.16 As a proof of this, 
it can be observed that the development of collective redress mechanisms has 
resulted in a number of uncoordinated initiatives during 2013–2016. Collective 
redress schemes were introduced in Lithuania in 2015, with the possibility for 
attorneys to sign a contingency fee agreement.17 The uk amended its Consum-
er Rights Act in 2015, thereby allowing opt-out antitrust collective proceed-
ings.18 To the same extent, opt-out actions are allowed in Belgium from 2014, 
 “Collective Redress: A Breakthrough or a Damp Sqibb?” Journal of Consumer Policy 37(1) 
(2014), 67–89, at 83.
14 For the discussion on low participation rates, see R. Van den Bergh, “Private  Enforcement 
of European Competition Law and the Persisting Collective Action Problem”  Maastricht 
Journal 20(1) (2013), 12–34, at 21. For the  discussion on the financial viability, see 
Which?, ‘Response to European Commission Consultation on Collective Redress’ 
(2011), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/ 
which_en.pdf>.
15 For a discussion, see also Hodges, op.cit note 13, at 78.
16 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying document to the White paper on 
damages actions for breach of the ec antitrust rules—Impact assessment, sec (2008) 
405, para. 147. 
17 In order to allow group actions, the Code of Civil Procedure was amended by introducing 
article 4411. Also article 49(6) of the Code was withdrawn. Contingency fees are allowed 
under article 50 of the Law on Advocacy.
18 Major amendment is set out in Schedule 8, entitled “Private Actions in Competition Law.” 
See Consumer Rights Act 2015, available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/
contents/enacted>.
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yet this possibility is only available to Belgian residents.19 In 2014, opt-in col-
lective actions were introduced in France, but some procedural measures do 
not fit in the eu context.20 Finally, none of the countries that allow for opt-out 
collective actions in some fashion (Denmark, Portugal, and the Netherlands) 
have changed their schemes into opt-in actions.
Indeed, the discrepancies between the legal systems create an uneven 
playing field in the internal market as regards antitrust damages. As a result, 
19 Act of 28 March 2014, Official Gazette on 29 April 2014, 35201.
20 Class action proceedings were introduced by Law No. 2014-344 of 17 March 2014. Con-
sumer actions are governed by Consumer Code, arts 423-1. One of the exceptional mea-
sure is that collective actions are only possible when the court asserts the defendant’s 
liability. Another is that the Court needs to rule on the admissibility of the action and 
on the defendant’s liability in the same court decision. For further discussion, see C. Ga-
teau and A. Diallo, “How Does the New French Class Actions Law fit in the eu Frame-
work?” (2014) Hogan Lovells, available at <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx? 
g=5d60d9ff-261a-49fc-975c-363e1124c80e>.
Table 1 The policy exemptions in the commission’s recommendation on collective redress
Measure The commission’s aspiration Exemption
Opt-in Each collective redress action  
should be based on an opt-in 
measure.
An opt-out measure may be 
duly “justified by reasons 




The losing party should  
reimburse the other side’s  
legal costs
The “loser pays” principle 
should be subject to national 
legal provisions.
Contingency fees Member states should not  
permit contingency fees in  
collective actions
Such fees may be allowed 




It is prohibited to base funders’  
compensation on the amount  
of the settlement, or on the  
compensation granted.
Funding agreement can 
be regulated by a public 
authority.
The court’s role A judge should manage the  
case effectively and detect  
abuses as early as possible.
The judge should carry out the 
necessary examination by his 
or her own initiative.
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 undertakings that have violated articles 101 and 102 of the tfeu are facing dif-
ferent levels of risk of being exposed to private claims from all potential an-
titrust victims, including the ones with smaller claims (typically consumers 
and small businesses). Indeed, the infringers can be exposed to such a wide-
ranging collective actions only if they are established in a claimant-friendly 
state, which allows for aggregating claims on the basis of an opt-out. It con-
sequently leads to a so-called “competitive advantage” for undertakings that 
have breached competition rules.21 In that regard, the opportunity for victims 
to claim compensation depends on whether they are located in a state with 
favourable rules on collective litigation.
Another issue is that an uneven playing field encourages “forum  shopping”—
plaintiffs choose the most favourable forum for bringing their claims. Indeed, 
“forum shopping” should be understood both from the negative and positive 
sides. As regards the negative perspective, victims with smaller claims lack 
the financial resources to choose a more favourable jurisdiction.22 There-
fore, the European Commission considers that “forum shopping is a privilege 
for the happy few.”23 The possibility for defendants to select the most favour-
able forum for defending their claims can be considered as both a positive and 
negative. On the one hand, “forum shopping” may bring uncertainties for na-
tional courts on whether they have jurisdiction. In addition, it may lead to a 
flood of claims (including the claims that lack ground) to states with favourable 
rules, such as the Netherlands.24 On the other hand, it allows for defendants to 
choose a country that may solve the proceedings in the most efficient way, also 
allowing to save litigation costs. As such, the extended right to bring damages 
claims is likely to ensure that more meritorious actions will reach the courts. 
Another viewpoint is that eu member states with effective collective redress 
schemes may encourage other states with underdeveloped laws to amend 
their systems in order to facilitate litigation opportunities in their  respective 
21 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, com(2013) 
404 final, pp. 9–10.
22 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, com(2013) 
404 final, pp. 9–10.
23 J. Almunia, “Antitrust damages in eu law and policy” College of Europe gclc annual confer-
ence (2013), available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-887_en.htm>.
24 S. Beeston and A. Rutten, “The Dutch torpedo case” Competition Law Insight (2015) 14–15, 
at 14.
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 forums. Nonetheless, no one can ensure that the competition between nation-
al systems and their various litigation landscapes will not make the playing 
field even more uneven.
Indeed, the divergence across the eu makes the possible introduction of 
a coherent European framework for collective redress highly complicated. 
A  legally binding measure would require intervention in national laws which 
already have specific schemes in place. Obviously, it would be very compli-
cated to define a balance between the different mechanisms of member states. 
But if the Commission decided to adopt a legally binding instrument, it would 
be advisable to adopt a sector-specific antitrust Directive on collective redress 
rather than issue a horizontal instrument. Under a sectorial measure, mini-
mum standards could be set that would prevent harsh intervention in national 
laws.25 Moreover, it would allow better adjustment to the unique nature of an-
titrust litigation, which requires compensating victims through different dis-
tribution chains. However, the provisions in the Directive should be set with 
extreme precision, because even a small lack of clarity may lead to uneven 
implementation. As the eu practice has shown, this issue may even occur due 
to the ordinary development of competition.26
If the eu truly seeks to achieve success in compensating victims in mass 
harm situations, there is a need to reconsider its strict approach to the Ameri-
can system. The introduction of one or more us elements would not necessar-
ily lead to abusive litigation. On the contrary, there are arguments that some 
American elements may have positive effects in safeguarding against abuse.
3.2 A Relationship with us Class Actions
Throughout history, us antitrust class actions have become one of the most, 
if not the most important tool for enforcing antitrust rules. Yet, this is mainly 
because the American system combines remedies that are aimed at achieving 
deterrence: an opt-out measure, contingency fees, treble damages, the one-
way fee shifting (the absence of the ‘loser-pays’ principle) and wide-ranging 
discovery rules. But the American system is considered to create incentives for 
25 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] oj c115/13, Article 288. 
A directive shall be binding, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form 
and methods. Therefore, a directive shall set minimum standards that would allow for 
member states to introduce more stringent measures.
26 See, e.g. Directive 2009/12/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2009 on airport charges [2009] oj l 70. For further discussion, see European Commission, 
“Aviation: Commission reports increased transparency in setting of airport charges, but 
uneven implementation of rules by the Member States” Press Release of 19 May 2014, 
available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-567_en.htm>.
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abusive litigation. This phenomenon mainly occurs if unmeritorious collective 
actions are brought to the courts, and if these actions force law-abiding defen-
dants (especially businesses) to settle in order to avoid reputational and finan-
cial damage.27 In the us context, this issue is called a “blackmail settlement.”28 
In order to prevent the perceived American problem, the European Commis-
sion warns against four tools:
• An opt-out system, which may jeopardize the freedom of claimants to decide 
whether they want to litigate or not.
• Third-party funding, which are seen as a potential factor driving frivolous 
actions.
• Contingency fees, which may create a risk for incentives to abuse the 
litigation.
• Punitive damages, which may lead to overcompensation of claimants.
However, the Commission’s approach is one-sided: these measures are shown 
only from the negative perspective, while positive aspects are ignored.
With regard to an opt-out approach, the counterclaim to the Commission’s 
position is the Court of Justice of the European Union’s decision in Eschig.29 
The Court ruled that opt-out actions are potentially in line with legal traditions 
as long as victims can effortlessly opt-out. Therefore, the claimant’s freedom to 
litigate or not to litigate can be respected even in opt-out actions.
Moreover, it should be stressed that contingency fees and third party fund-
ing may have positive effects in facilitating meritorious litigation when they 
are combined with the ‘loser pays’ rule. A lawyer or a funder (hereafter both 
regarded as “investors”) bringing unmeritorious claims should assume the 
risk of being hit with the other side’s costs, if the case is lost. These costs may 
be substantial in antitrust cases, which are typically complex, and hence the 
costs of legal representation may generate substantial expenses. For example, 
in Germany—one of the most plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions—antitrust dam-
ages actions can generate significant costs to the other side.30 Another point 
27 Communication op.cit note 9, at 7–8.
28 See, e.g. J.M. Landers, “Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Ac-
tions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma”, Southern California Law Review 47 (1974), 
842–890, at 843.
29 Case c-199/08 Erhard Eschig v.uniqa Sachversicherung ag [2009] ecr 1-8295, para. 64.
30 Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Higher District Court), judgment of 18 February 2015, vi-u 
(Kart) 3/14, NZKart 2015, 201. The Court calculated that if the defendant won the case, the 
other side’s claim would generate more than €5 million euros to the claimant.
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is that investors should consider the fact that bringing antitrust claims will re-
quire extensive evidences, but the eu discovery is subject to many conditions 
and limitations.31 Furthermore, performing the proportionality test of disclo-
sure is the responsibility of national courts, which are unpredictable in their 
execution. In addition, judges are responsible for the screening of whether 
collective actions pass the test of commonality and suitability.32 Under such 
circumstances, investors are mainly interested in taking meritorious cases, 
which will generate strong evidences for passing the certification and for prov-
ing damages. In contrast, speculative claims are weak in their nature, as they 
lack merit.
Punitive damages do not inherently lead to overcompensation of the claim-
ant party. The European Commission does not specify how expensive antitrust 
collective actions can be. In reality, the litigation costs (administrative, exper-
tise, etc.) can be so high that they consume a large portion of the recovery, 
thereby leaving small amounts to victims.33 Therefore, the award of punitive 
damages may be needed to counterbalance the enforcement costs of the com-
pensation objective. But if the case generates overcompensation to claimants, 
the surplus can be distributed on a cy-pres basis, under which unclaimed funds 
are provided to non-profit beneficiaries.34 This compensation distribution 
model is well illustrated through the Rover case in the uk.35 The European 
Commission detected price fixing by Rover, who was required to pay £1 million 
in compensation to consumers.36 It proved impossible to define customers to 
31 Directive, op.cit note 1, Article 5.
32 See, e.g. Ž. Juška “The Impact of Contingency Fees on Collective Antitrust Actions: Ex-
periments from Lithuania and Poland”, Review of Central and East European Law 41(3–4) 
(2016) 368–395, at 377–380 (tbl. 1).
33 For high expenses in opt-in cases, see ufc–Que Choisir “Consultation de la Commission 
Europenne sur les Recours Collectifs Contribution De L ufc-Choisir” (2011). For high 
expenses in opt-out cases, see D.A. Crane, “Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement”, 
Vanderbilt Law Review 63 (2010), 675–723, at 682–83.
34 In favour of a cy-pres remedy is the uk consumer organization, see Which?, op.cit note 
14. A cy pres remedy has been very popular in the us. However, it has been criticized for 
distributing a surplus to the beneficiaries who are not related with the violation. See, e.g. 
J. Johnston, “Comment, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything Is Possible: How Cy Pres 
Creates Improper Incentives in Class Action Settlements”, The Journal of Law, Economics 
& Policy 9 (2013) 277–304, at 292–93.
35 European Commission, “Commission Decision on Rover Case” Press Release, available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-90-31_en.htm>.
36 A. Maciuleviciute, ‘Litigation Funding in Relation to the Establishment of a European 
Mechanism of Collective Redress’ (2012) beuc position. Retrieved 22 April 2017, http://
www.beuc.org/publications/2012-00074-01-e.pdf.
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whom the antitrust violation caused harm. Therefore, Which?—the uk con-
sumer organisation—received the majority of money to spend on information 
projects: one regarded informing people about car safety and another regarded 
informing about the accessibility of cars for disabled people.37
On the basis of these points, it can be argued that the Commission missed 
the opportunity to suggest a more assertive approach. An assertive mechanism 
should be understood as crossing the borders of the eu compensation-based 
model, which combines conservative tools. If there was flexibility in utilising 
one or more American elements, there would be more possibilities to seek 
a better means of compensation. However, the us system should not be un-
derstood as the best fit for the eu mechanism, as it differs greatly in terms 
of rationale, design, and stated goals. Instead, the Commission should take a 
closer look at member states, which do not fully rely on the proposals by the 
Recommendation, but where antitrust collective actions have been working 
in practice.
4 eu Member States’ Experiments with Forceful Tools
So far, antitrust collective litigation has been viable in member states, where 
collective proceedings are based on an opt-out basis. There are three countries 
that require further discussion. Each of them will be discussed in turn.
4.1 Portugal
In Portugal, Law 83/95 of 31 August (1995) allows a ‘popular action’ to be 
brought (acção popular), which is equivalent to us-style class actions.38 The 
first opt-out antitrust damages claim was filed against Sport tv, which held 
37 A. Maciuleviciute, ‘Re-directing Justice’ (2012) beuc position. Retrieved 22 April 2017, 
http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2012-00561-01-e.pdf.
38 The legislator gave effect to article 52 (3) of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic 
in order to promote the protection of general interest, such consumer protection, health, 
antitrust and etc. There are three types of popular actions: popular action for compen-
sating damages (including class actions), preventive popular actions and popular action 
to dispute administrative actions. For further discussion, see R.V. Reis and M. Mesquita, 
“Portugal” British Institute for International and Comparative Law, available at <http://
www.collectiveredress.org/collective-redress/reports/portugal/overview>; H.S. Antunes, 
‘Class Actions, Group Litigation & Other Forms of Collective Litigation (Portuguese 
Report)’ (2007). Retrieved 22 April 2017, http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/de 
fault/files/documents/Portugal_National_Report.pdf.
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an illegal monopoly in paid premium sports channels.39 The action sought to 
compensate over 600,000 customers for damages directly arising from the an-
ticompetitive conduct, and to compensate 3,000,000 customers for damages 
indirectly occurring due to the inflation of prices and the reduction of com-
petition.40 The events behind the case initiation were somewhat unique: the 
claim was filed by the Portuguese Competition Observatory, a non-profit asso-
ciation of academics from a number of universities. At first glance, it may show 
that collective actions can be brought on the sole basis of opt-out. However, 
it rather seems to be an incidental tentative action of academics who, due to 
their professional curiosity, decided to experiment with the first popular ac-
tion in antitrust. It is hard to imagine that a second lawsuit will be brought on 
the same basis in the absence of private funding tools,attorney’s contingency 
fees or the third party funding.
That this case is exceptional can be illustrated through the Danish example. 
It offers the possibility of an opt-out class action when claims are very small 
(not exceeding dkk 2000, which is around €270), but only if the consumer 
ombudsman acts as group representative.41 Since opt-out collective actions 
became available in 2008, the measure has not been yet tested in the antitrust 
area.
4.2 The Netherlands
The Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Claims (wcam) allows for 
the Amsterdam Appeal Court to declare a binding collective settlement, unless 
someone declares to opt-out.42 Interestingly enough, collective settlements are 
different from collective actions. The wcam is codified in sections 7:908–7:910 
of the Dutch Civil Code and articles 1013–1018 of the Dutch Civil Procedure 
Code. Collective actions are governed by article 3:305a of the Civil Code. This 
provision allows for foundations or associations (not an individual claimant) 
to seek a declaratory relief, but the Code does not establish the possibility to 
bring a compensatory damages action.43 It is considered that a declaratory re-
lief may incentivise the alleged infringer to enter into a settlement agreement 
39 Lisbon Judicial Court, case no. 7074/15.8T8LSB.
40 M.S. Ferro, “Collective Redress: Will Portugal Show the Way?” Journal of Euro Competition 
Law & Practice 6(5) (2015), 299–300, at 300.
41 The Danish Administration of Justice Act, cf. Consolidated Act No. 1261 of October 23, 
2007.
42 The Law of 23 June 2005, Stb. 340.
43 For discussion, see J.E. Richman, ‘United States: Dutch Collective Actions vs. Collec-
tive Settlements’ (2016), available at <http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/536358/
Shareholders/Dutch+Collective+Actions+vs+Collective+Settlements>.
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with victims for compensating damages under the wcam. In addition to the 
availability of opt-out collective settlement, the Netherlands is exceptional for 
favourable rules on the ‘loser pays’ principle.44 It should be stressed that a new 
Dutch bill on collective damages action was presented to the Parliament in No-
vember 2016. It is unknown what the final form of the legislation will be, but an 
opt-out tool was proposed as a main tool under the preliminary document.45
So far, the most notable antitrust mass claim was instituted by Claims Fund-
ing International (Equilib) on behalf of victims across Europe against klm, 
Air France and Martinair.46 In September 2010, Equilib filed a claim exceeding 
€400 million in relation to the Commission’s decision in the air cargo cartel.47 
Notably, the case was brought on behalf of direct purchasers and indirect pur-
chasers (including Phillips and Ericsson). In January 2015, Equilib brought a 
claim against British Airways and Lufthansa on the same factual and legal basis 
as in the first case.48 So far, both cases have not attracted criticism regarding 
abusive litigation by Equilib.
4.3 The United Kingdom
Schedule 8 of the 2015 Consumer Rights Act contains amendments to the Com-
petition Act 1998 so as to provide possibilities for opt-out collective proceed-
ings in the context of competition law infringements. A new collective actions 
regime is only available in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (cat). But opt-out 
collective actions can only bind claimants domiciled in the uk. Under the new 
possibility, two follow-on antitrust collective actions have been brought.
In May 2016, the first one was brought by Ms. Dorothy Gibson (the pro-
posed class representative) against Pride Mobility Products (the proposed 
defendant).49 The proposed follow-on collective proceedings were based on 
44 See, e.g. Frank van Alphen, 2010. “Luchtvrachtkartel Krijgt reuzeclaim van Verladers.” De 
Volkskrant. September 30 (citing Pierre Bos, the former counsel in the case of Equilib vs. 
klm, who claimed that the Dutch courts were chosen because of the favourable rules on 
the “loser pays” principle, as plaintiffs do not have to pay for the actual costs incurred by 
the defendants).
45 I. Tzankova, ‘New Dutch Bill on Collective Damages Action’ (2016) <http://conflictoflaws 
.net/2016/new-dutch-bill-on-collective-damages-action/> accessed 19 January 2017.
46 Claims Funding International plc. Press Release (30 September 2010).
47 Airfreight (Case comp/39258) Commission Decision C(2010) 7694 [2010] oj c 371.
48 See Amsterdam District Court, 7 January 2015 (c/13/561169 / ha za 14–283). In the deci-
sion, it was asserted that the District Court of Amsterdam has jurisdiction over antitrust 
follow-on claims instituted by Equilib against British Airways and Lufthansa.
49 Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of an Application to Commence Collective Pro-
ceedings under Section 47b of the Competition Act 1998, Case No. 1257/7/7/16. Retrieved 
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the decision of the Office of Fair Trading, finding that Pride Mobility Prod-
ucts violated competition law through a form of resale price maintenance be-
tween 2010 and 2012.50 Around 30,000 victims were included in the class under 
an opt-out basis, and they were alleging an overpayment for mobility scoot-
ers. Class members were entitled to compensation of around £7.7 million, or 
around £200 each. It remains unclear how this claim is going to be funded if 
the certification was granted. The 2015 Consumer Rights Act prohibits the use 
of contingency fee agreements in collective proceedings. Instead, npc’s class 
action has been brought using a combination of a conditional fee agreement 
and after-the-event (ate) insurance. During the class certification hearing in 
December 2016, the cat issued a decision that the proposed subclasses were 
not well associated.51 As a consequence, Gibson requested an adjournment to 
reformulate her claim. In March 2017, the cat approved the request and has 
granted a second attempt to amend the lawsuit.52 At this point, it can be con-
sidered a success that Gibson was found to be a suitable class representative. 
Yet, the Tribunal has proved to be rigorous when evaluating common issues in 
class certification.
In September 2016, another collective action was brought by an English so-
licitor (Walter Merricks) in the case Merricks v. MasterCard.53 A damages claim 
was filed on behalf of British consumers (around 46 million) against Master-
Card, which allegedly imposed illegal charges from 1992 to 2007. The claim is 
based on a finding made by the European Commission in 2007.54 The value of 
the claim is around £14 billion, making it the largest legal claim in uk history. 
22 April 2017, http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/1257_Dorothy_Gibson_Summary_210616 
.pdf (summary of the case).
50 Office of Fair Trading, decision of 27 March 2014, ce/9578-12. Retrieved 22 April 2017, https://
www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-agreements-in-the-mobility-aids-sector.
51 Competition Appeal Tribunal, Dorothy Gibson v Pride Mobility Products Limited, Case 
No. 1257/7/7/16. Retrieved 22 April 2017, http://www.catribunal.org.uk/237-9255/1257-7-7 
-16-Dorothy-Gibson.html.
52 Competition Appeal Tribunal, Judgment (Application for a Collective Proceedings Order) 
of 31 March 2017. Retrieved 22 April 2017, http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/1257_Doro 
thy_Gibson_Judgment_CPO_CAT_9_310317.pdf.
53 Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of an Application to Commence Collective Pro-
ceedings under Section 47b of the Competition Act 1998, Case No. 1266/7/7/16. Retrieved 
22 April 2017, http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/1266_Walter_Hugh_Summary_210616 
.pdf (summary of the case).
54 MasterCard/EuroCommerce/Commercial Cards (Case COMP/34.579—COMP/36.518—
COMP/38.580) Commission Decision of 17 December 2007 [2009] oj c 264/8.
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The litigation funder (the Chicago-based company Gerchen Keller Capital) 
will provide funding of up to £40 million to finance the lawsuit.
4.4 Third Party Funding and Contingency Fees
These cases show that mass claims (with the unique exception in Portugal) 
should be reinforced by third party funding and opt-out schemes. Another 
form of third party funding for financing antitrust collective claims has been 
the so-called Special Purpose Vehicle. Under this model, operations are limited 
to the purchase or the assignment of claims (varying from several to dozens), 
thereby taking the hassle of subsequent enforcement. As a consequence, the 
assignment of claims is limited to cases that individually generate significant 
damages, usually after the European Commission’s dg Competition’s decision 
in cartel cases. So far, the most prominent private litigator has been the Cartel 
Damage Claims sa (cdc), a company incorporated under Belgian law but with 
its main activities being performed in Germany. However, the future of the 
cdc (and other spv) has become very unclear after the Düsseldorf District 
Court’s decision.55 In that case, 36 damaged companies purchased the cartel-
related claim to the cdc. The Court dismissed the claim because the cdc was 
found to have insufficient funds to cover the other side’s costs if the defendant 
won the case.56 This case shows how the ‘loser pays’ principle can act as an 
effective deterrent against abusive litigation, but it also can serve as a device 
for significantly reducing the investor’s possibilities to bring damages claims. 
However, some countries (as for example mentioned in the Netherlands) have 
more lenient rules on the ‘loser pays’ principle. Therefore, the magnitude of 
deterrence depends on a country-by-country basis.
The major problem is that third party funding is quite unpopular or unavail-
able in eu states, except for the ones mentioned before. Another funding option 
for collective actions is contingency fee agreements, where fees (a  percentage 
of the class recovery) are paid only if the case was won. However, contingency 
fees are prohibited in most states; legal standing is typically limited to public 
authorities.57 Few countries allow contingency fee agreements in the event 
of collective actions, but these agreements have not been utilised in case of 
55 Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf op.cit note 25.
56 In case of the ultimate loss, the other side costs for cdc would be around 5 million euros. 
Therefore, the Court concluded cdc is financially incapable of leading the case.
57 See, e.g. M.G. Warren iii, “The u.s. Securities Fraud Class Action: An Unlikely Export 
to the European Union” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 37(3) (2012) 1075–1114, at 
1089. According to the author, the standing is established for governmental authorities 
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antitrust collective litigation.58 Another option is conditional fee  agreements, 
under which attorneys/litigators receive an hourly fee, but a success fee is also 
paid if the case won. However, this funding option is highly restricted in col-
lective actions, because claimants are still required to pay hourly legal fees for 
attorneys, which may be substantial.
5 Litigation Abuses: A Perspective on the us and the eu
The experiences and initiatives discussed above show that combining third-
party litigation and opt-out schemes does not attract the perceived issue of 
“blackmail settlement”. This is not surprising, given that the occurrence of this 
phenomenon in the eu context is highly unlikely. Even if contingency fees 
(accused of attracting “fishing expedition”59) were combined with opt-out 
schemes, there is a low likelihood of plaintiffs being able to compel businesses 
to settle cases lacking merit. Still, there would be significant differences in the 
antitrust systems of the us and the eu, which are illustrated in Table 2.
(e.g. Finland), consumer associations (e.g. Greece, France) and to other specified organi-
zations (e.g. Portugal).
58 Contingency fees are allowed in collective actions in Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, 
and Sweden. However, there have been no antitrust collective actions on the basis of a 
contingency fee agreement.
59 Communication op.cit note 9, at 8.





Damages award Permits an award of treble 
damages
Allows the award of full 
 compensation, which prevents 
the overcompensation of 
claimants
Discovery Liberal party-initiated 
discovery
The discovery is only possible 
when the court approves the 
proportionality of the request
Cost allocation method One-way-fee shifting rule “Loser pays” principle
Final outcome Jury trials Court decision
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It can be seen that deterrence-based measures are particularly unique for 
the us mechanism. In the first place, federal antitrust laws allow automatic 
awards of treble damages to plaintiffs.60 Indeed, this measure can expose 
the defendant to significant potential costs.61 To the same extent, the liberal 
party-initiated discovery permits plaintiffs to propound broad discovery re-
quests that entail substantial expenses.62 Another unique measure is that the 
us antitrust law is based on the one-way fee shifting rule, according to which 
plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees, but this provision does not apply to 
defendants.63 Finally, antitrust class actions should end in jury trials, thereby 
conferring a component of “unpredictability.”64 When also combined with 
opt-out and contingency fees, plaintiffs are empowered (in cases with favour-
able conditions) to force defendants to even settle cases lacking merit.
In the eu context, the American measures listed in Table 2 are contrary (to a 
greater or lesser degree) to the legal traditions of civil law countries. As regards 
trebling of damages, it may lead to the unjust enrichment of claimants. Broad 
discovery rules may jeopardise the effectiveness of the leniency system. The 
“loser pays” principle is one of the central safeguards against abusive litigation 
in collective actions. Finally, jury trials are predominantly utilised in common 
law legal systems. It is therefore highly questionable whether blackmailing 
would be possible in the absence of the American elements listed in Table 2. It 
is true that opt-out schemes generate high aggregate value, but this is the only 
component that may potentially incentivize defendants to settle unmeritori-
ous cases. However, opt-out schemes are not the main concern in the us. The 
major issue is the wide pre-discovery rules, which may generate massive costs 
for defendants. Also, there is a high risk of an unsuccessful outcome, because 
jury members are likely to view the defendant (usually a large corporation) 
from the negatively, regardless of if it abides by the law or not. When this risk 
is combined with the possibility of trebling of damages, defendants are incen-
tivised to settle the case rather than risking going to final proceedings. In fact, 
these components are not possible in the eu.
60 Clayton Act, 15 u.s.c. §§ 15(a).
61 J.P. Davis and R.H. Lande, “Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust 
Enforcement” Georgia Law Review 48 (2013) 1–81, at 37–39.
62 See, e.g. Boeynaems v. la Fitness International, llc 285 f.r.d. 331, 334–35, 341 
(e.d. Pa. 2012).
63 Clayton Act, 15 u.s.c. §§ 15(a).
64 A. Jones, “Private Enforcement of eu Competition Law: A Comparison with, and Lessons 
from, the us” in M. Bergström, M. Iacovides and M. Strand (eds.), Harmonising eu Com-
petition Litigation: The New Directive and Beyond (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2016) p. 20.
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However, when opt-out schemes are combined with contingency fees, the 
possibility remains that litigation abuses will appear in different forms. Given 
the large financial interests at stake, group representatives (the lead plaintiff 
and the group advocate) may represent the group members inadequately in 
order to maximise their own benefits. The first possibility is that they will set 
disproportionately high contingency fees. The second is that group members 
will not be properly informed about their rights to leave the group. The third 
option is that group representatives will make early settlements with defen-
dants, generating low awards. The fourth is that the undistributed awards of 
the group would be distributed in an abusive way.65 When compared to the 
“blackmail settlement”, these abuses are more realistic in the eu context. 
 Indeed, victims with small claims are not well aware of the case or its founda-
tions. Typically, the group members give complete freedom to the group repre-
sentatives, who can structure the case for their own benefit.
Then again, two factors may significantly reduce the incentives for wrong-
doers to abuse the litigation. One factor is that the “loser pays” principle is re-
inforced by the lawyer’s disciplinary liability rules in the national context. For 
example, an attorney can be removed from the Bar if he or she acts contrary 
to professional conduct.66 Another factor is that courts are closely involved in 
the proceedings, especially in the discovery, thereby allowing for the judge to 
decide whether disclosure requests are proportional or not.67 It also requires 
closer monitoring of group interests, especially in the certification stage. But, 
after all, determining the potential of abusive litigation is very complicated, 
because contingency fees have not been tested in opt-out schemes in the eu 
landscape. Nevertheless, it is clear that the phenomenon of abusive litigation 
may occur in different forms in the eu member states: first, each jurisdiction 
has introduced collective redress schemes in its own fashion; second, different 
safeguards have been introduced in order to prevent litigation abuses. To sum 
up, when shaping the future of collective litigation, eu legislators should pay 
particular attention to the member states’ schemes (even if they differ to some 
extent) rather than relying on the us system, which is different in its stated ob-
jectives and legal traditions. Then again, the introduction of certain American 
elements does not necessarily lead to the perceived American problems, as 
proved by experiences in the eu states.
Hopefully, 2017, or 2018 at the latest will be when the European Commis-
sion takes positive actions in this policy area. Given states’ uncoordinated 
65 Juška, op.cit note 32, 390.
66 For the discussion on disciplinary penalties in Lithuania and Poland, see ibid., at 391–391.
67 Directive, op.cit note 1, Article 5.
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 initiatives, it is probably unrealistic that the European Commission will adopt 
a Directive for antitrust collective redress. It would be regarded a huge victory 
if the eu issued a sector-specific recommendation on antitrust collective ac-
tions, but this time including provisions (in some fashion) on opt-out schemes, 
contingency fees and third party funding. Indeed, in 2017 or 2018 the European 
Commission should give its final decision on whether collective redress actions 
will be regulated at the eu level or not. Later it might be too late, as national 
schemes will deviate too far from each other. Therefore, creating an eu-wide 
antitrust collective litigation will become difficult, if not an impossible task.
6 Conclusion
The adoption of the Directive on damages actions has been a significant step 
toward achieving better means for victims to claim damages for breaches of 
antitrust law. However, the right to seek damages is significantly restrained for 
consumers with small claims; no action of this type could function without 
assertive schemes for aggregating claims. The Recommendation on collec-
tive redress is not very helpful for two reasons; first, it is not a legally bind-
ing  document; second, the proposed measures suggest too many obstacles 
for compensatory collective actions to ever be brought. For both reasons, the 
Recommendation has failed to incentivise member states to adopt or amend 
the existing collective redress schemes on the basis of the proposed principles. 
Contrary to the current stance in the eu policy, some member states have ex-
perimented with American-style tools. Even if the national experiments have 
not triggered a flood of litigation, an increase in antitrust collective litigation 
can be found in Portugal, the Netherlands, and the uk. These states clearly 
demonstrate that an opt-out measure is the key element in ensuring compen-
sation in antitrust mass actions, yet it still has to be reinforced by additional 
incentives to sue, like third party funding. Therefore, these pro-active states 
send a clear message to the eu legislators: compensatory collective actions are 
possible in the eu context, but only if there is possibility in utilising one or 
another American element.
In addition, it was found that the American issue of “blackmail settle-
ment” is highly unlikely in the eu context, even if contingency fees and opt-
out schemes were combined. But the eu should be aware of other types of 
litigation abuses. One of the main possibilities is that group representatives 
will represent group members inadequately. It means that they can structure 
the case in a way that they will obtain disproportionally high compensation 
at the expense of group members. Even though this behaviour is realistic, the 
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 possibility is significantly diminished due to available safeguards (such as, the 
“loser pays” principle and national ethics rules). In any case, no one can en-
sure that litigation abuses would not appear in some fashion in the eu states. 
Nevertheless, it is preferable to have effective collective redress schemes with 
a minimal possibility of abusive litigation than to have schemes without a fu-
ture, as it is foreseen under the proposed principles of the Recommendation 
on collective redress.
To sum up, the success of eu compensatory collective actions is dependent 
on the American style measures. 2017 or 2018 at the latest is the time when the 
eu needs to decide whether collective redress should be regulated at the eu 
level; later it will be too late. If the positive decision is taken, the suggestion 
would be to rely on the schemes of member states and hence to allow some 
flexibility in using us-style remedies. But the mechanism on the basis of purely 
conservative tools should be denied, as it will have little or no impact on com-
pensating victims with small harms.
